To: Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council

From: Councilmember Taplin, Vice Mayor Droste (co-sponsor), Councilmember Wengraf (co-sponsor)

Subject: Budget referral: Automated license plate readers for community safety improvement

RECOMMENDATION
That the Berkeley City Council take the following actions to enable and deploy tactical technologies in strategic public spaces and the public ROW for the improvement of community safety and determent, intervention, prevention of illegal dumping and/or investigation of violent crime and traffic violations:

● Authorize the City Manager to install Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) at strategic locations including public facilities, entrances to the city and strategic intersections in areas impacted by violent crime, traffic violations including bicycle and pedestrian safety infractions, illegal dumping, drug offenses, and other criminal activity; and refer to the budget process cost of ALPRs.

● Refer to the City Manager the development of a policy pursuant and subject to City of Berkeley Surveillance Ordinance enabling the use of ALPRs in fixed locations and mobile trailers by the Berkeley Police Department, while restricting data storage to standards in City of Vallejo Police Department Policy 426 ordinance and distribution; and study feasibility of data access standards for some ALPRs to those set forth in Senate Bill 210 (Wiener, 2021).

CURRENT SITUATION AND ITS EFFECTS
According to the Berkeley Police Department’s 2019/2020 Crime Report, Berkeley has seen marked increases in aggravated assault, homicides, auto theft and larceny over the past two years.1 While the overall crime rate remained relatively flat, specific categories of property crimes increased sharply—especially vehicle thefts, which increased by 66% in 2020.

According to a 2018 study\textsuperscript{2} by the Center for Policing Equity, Black people comprise only 8% of Berkeley’s population, but a disproportionate 46% of people subject to police uses of force. In light of this evidence, and in the wake of the national outcry over the death of George Floyd, the City Council adopted a resolution\textsuperscript{3} on July 14, 2020 directing the City Manager in part to “identify elements of police work that could be achieved through alternative programs, policies, systems, and community investments.”

Currently, the police department’s Parking Enforcement Bureau uses Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) for time zone parking and scofflaw enforcement, replacing the practice of physically “chalking” car tires, but ALPR technology has not been implemented in the city for other law enforcement purposes. According to the City Manager’s 2020 Surveillance Technology Report, there were an average of 12,059 successful license plate “reads” per day in the month of September, 2020. From October 2019 to October 2020, there were 44,068 “hits” detecting a positive violation, roughly 25% (14,945) of which resulted in enforcement by citation issuance.\textsuperscript{4}

Pursuant to Berkeley Municipal Code Chapter 2.99 Section 2.99.070, the City Manager’s office is required to report on surveillance technology on an annual basis.

**BACKGROUND**

Some research has found that ALPRs contribute to marginal improvements in public safety outcomes with respect to vehicle thefts and traffic safety. The use of LPR technology has increased significantly in law enforcement agencies across the US in the past decade, but outcomes have been inconsistently tracked, which limits available research.\textsuperscript{5} One qualitative case study found that criminal investigators adapted LPR technology to a broader range of investigative work, such as rapid responses and corroborating suspect alibis.\textsuperscript{6}

An analysis of a randomized control trial in the City of Vallejo found that ALPRs attached to police vehicles enabled a 140% increase in detection of stolen vehicles, while arrests were more efficient with stationary ALPRs in fixed locations.\textsuperscript{7} A study on LPR technology in Mesa, AZ

\textsuperscript{3} https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/City_Council/2020/07_Jul/Documents/2020-07-14_Item_18d_Transform_Community_Safety_pdf.aspx
\textsuperscript{4} https://www.cityofberkeley.info/Clerk/City_Council/2020/11_Nov/Documents/2020-11-10_Item_19_Resolution_Accepting_the_Surveillance.aspx
found that LPRs resulted in an eightfold increase in the number of plates scanned, more positive scans, arrests and recovery of stolen vehicles, and a reduction in calls for drug offenses. However, the study did not find a statistically significant reduction in vehicle thefts in hot spots compared to manual checks, possibly because the presence of law enforcement officers performing manual checks had a more preventative effect. Another study of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department found that “LPR use may have contributed to modest improvements in case closures for auto theft and robbery”—the former in the long term, and the latter both short- and long term.

According to recent analysis by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, one law enforcement agency found that drivers with suspended, revoked, or restricted licenses were 2.2 times more likely to be involved in serious or fatal crashes than other drivers, and that identifying these drivers with ALPRs “could affect traffic safety positively by targeting violator vehicles that are more prone to crash risk.” A quasi-experimental survey of data from Buffalo, NY found a reduction in violent crime and traffic accidents associated with roadblocks using LPRs.

Rationale for Recommendation
Reimagining public safety necessitates significant improvements in public safety outcomes, including practical solutions to traffic safety and property crime. California law currently preempts municipalities from transferring law enforcement into civilian duties or automated speed cameras.

While auto thefts in Berkeley increased by 66% in 2020, a 2021 City Auditor analysis of the Berkeley Police Department found that Officer-Initiated Stops disproportionately target Black and Latino drivers relative to their share of the city’s population.

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ALPRs therefore present an opportunity to reduce property crimes and improve traffic safety while also reducing civilian encounters with police officers conducting ad hoc traffic enforcement, which the 2021 audit found to have a significant racial bias against Black and Latino drivers. ALPRs could make enforcement more fair, impartial, and effective.

However, ALPR data storage gives rise to several privacy concerns. In *Carpenter v. United States*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that accessing location data tracking an individual’s movements from their cell phone constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and requires a search warrant.\(^{13}\) While ALPR scans are subject to reasonableness standards for searches under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, state courts have found that ALPR alerts are sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion, though there are situations that require further intervention to establish reasonableness or avoid error.\(^{14}\)

In *Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department*, the Virginia Supreme Court ruled that GPS data and images associated with license plate numbers were private personal information (PPI), but license plate numbers themselves stored in ALPR databases were not.\(^{15}\) The California Supreme Court has also underscored such a distinction between “bulk data collection” of license plate numbers that did not “produce records of investigations” for particular crimes.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{16}\) Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 400 P.3d 432
contrast, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor argued in *United States v. Jones* that government agencies collecting “private aspects of identity” could be “susceptible to abuse.”

This calls into question the so-called third party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment—the longstanding precedent that individuals may be reasonably considered to waive their right to privacy and assume any information provided to third parties may eventually be accessed by the government—given the vast array of information government agencies can now access through surveillance technology. To carefully balance privacy and policing efficacy under this new paradigm, Newell (2013) recommends strictly limiting data retention for non-“hit” scans, and maintaining anonymized ALPR data subject to public disclosure laws.

California Vehicle Code Section 2413(b) restricts the California Highway Patrol (CHP)’s retention LPR data for 60 days unless it is being used as evidence in a felony investigation. Subsection (c) restricts the distribution of this data strictly to law enforcement agencies or officers and “only for purposes of locating vehicles or persons when either are reasonably suspected of being involved in the commission of a public offense.”

In 2015, Senate Bill 34 imposed additional security and privacy requirements on the use of ALPR data. Unfortunately, a State Auditor report in 2020 surveying four local law enforcement agencies in California found that ALPR policies were out of compliance with SB34, retained images for far longer than needed or allowed, and had no processes in place to safeguard local compliance. For example, the State Auditor “did not find evidence that the agencies had always determined whether an entity receiving shared images had a right and a need to access the images or even that the entity was a public agency.”

In 2018, a lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California revealed that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had purchased access to private databases containing ALPR data with 5 billion individual data points for civil immigration enforcement, and had obtained ALPR data from over 80 local law enforcement agencies. However, in 2017, Senate Bill 54 greatly restricted the ability of California law enforcement agencies to share information with ICE.

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17 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);
19 [https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB34](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB34)
22 [https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB54](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB54)
Introduced in January 2021, Senate Bill 210 by State Sen. Scott Wiener (D-SF) would further limit data storage and access for ALPRs. These may be infeasible for local jurisdictions with current and anticipated staffing levels but merit some consideration.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
1. Gun buyback programs have not demonstrated significant efficacy except in limited circumstances within more holistic community-based violence prevention programs.

2. With the stalling of Assembly Bill 550 in this year’s legislative session, automated speeding cameras are not currently permitted in the state of California.

3. On October 27, 2020, the City Council referred to the Community Engagement Process for Reimagining Public Safety the creation of a Group Violence Intervention Program (GVI), or “Operation Ceasefire,” that will assemble a Berkeley-centered interjurisdictional working group of community members, law enforcement personnel, and supportive services providers to address gun violence. Current staffing capacity in the City Manager’s office is insufficient to develop such a program before the process is complete.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
None.

FISCAL IMPACTS
In 2017, an amendment to Contract No. 9977 from the City Manager’s Office itemized a unit cost of $78,363 for each ALPR system. Costs for this referral may be different because this contract was for mobile ALPRs used for parking enforcement, not in fixed locations.

CONTACT
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ATTACHMENTS
1. City of Vallejo ALPR Policy

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23 [https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB210](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB210)
26 [https://ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2017/07_Jul/Documents/2017-07-11_Item_13_Contract_No_9977_Amendment.aspx](https://ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City_Council/2017/07_Jul/Documents/2017-07-11_Item_13_Contract_No_9977_Amendment.aspx)
Policy

426
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs)

426.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance for the capture, storage, and use of digital data obtained through the use of Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) technology.

426.2 DEFINITIONS

(a) **Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR):** A device that uses cameras and computer technology to compare digital images to lists of known information of interest.

(b) **ALPR Operator:** Trained Department members who may utilize ALPR system/equipment. ALPR operators may be assigned to any position within the Department, and the ALPR Administrator may order the deployment of the ALPR systems for use in various efforts.

(c) **ALPR Administrator:** The Investigations Bureau Captain or the Chief’s designee, serves as the ALPR Administrator for the Department.

(d) **Hot List:** A list of license plates associated with vehicles of interest compiled from one or more databases including, but not limited to, NCIC, CA DMV, Local BOLO’s, etc.

(e) **Vehicles of Interest:** Including, but not limited to vehicles which are reported as stolen; display stolen license plates or tags; vehicles linked to missing and/or wanted persons and vehicles flagged by the Department of Motor Vehicle Administration or law enforcement agencies.

(f) **Detection:** Data obtained by an ALPR of an image (such as a license plate) within public view that was read by the device, including potential images (such as the plate and description of vehicle on which it was displayed), and information regarding the location of the ALPR system at the time of the ALPR’s read.

(g) **Hit:** Alert from the ALPR system that a scanned license plate number may be in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or other law enforcement database for a specific reason including, but not limited to, being related to a stolen car, wanted person, missing person, domestic violation protective order or terrorist-related activity.

426.3 ADMINISTRATION
The ALPR technology, also known as License Plate Recognition (LPR), allows for the automated detection of license plates along with the vehicle make, model, color and unique identifiers through the Vallejo Police Department's ALPR's system and the vendor's vehicle identification technology. The technology is used by the Vallejo Police Department to convert data associated with vehicle license plates and vehicle descriptions for official law enforcement purposes, including identifying stolen or wanted vehicles, stolen license plates and missing persons. It may also be used to gather information related to active warrants, homeland security, electronic surveillance, suspect interdiction and stolen property recovery.
All installation and maintenance of ALPR equipment, as well as ALPR data retention and access, shall be managed by the Department Information Technology Manager. The Department Information Technology Manager will assign members under his/her command to administer the day-to-day operation of the ALPR equipment and data.

426.3.1 ALPR ADMINISTRATOR
The Investigations Bureau Captain shall be responsible for compliance with the requirements of Civil Code § 1798.90.5 et seq. This includes, but is not limited to (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) Only properly trained sworn officers, crime analysts, and police assistants are allowed access to the ALPR system or to collect ALPR information.

(b) Ensuring that training requirements are completed for authorized users.

(c) ALPR system monitoring to ensure the security of the information and compliance with applicable privacy laws.

(d) Ensuring that procedures are followed for system operators and to maintain records of access in compliance with Civil Code § 1798.90.52.

(e) The title and name of the current designee in overseeing the ALPR operation is maintained. Continually working with the Custodian of Records on the retention and destruction of ALPR data.

(f) Ensuring this policy and related procedures are conspicuously posted on the department’s website.

426.4 OPERATIONS
Use of an ALPR is restricted to the purposes outlined below. Department members shall not use, or allow others to use the equipment or database records for any unauthorized purpose (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).

(a) An ALPR shall only be used for official law enforcement business.

(b) An ALPR may be used in conjunction with any routine patrol operation or criminal investigation; reasonable suspicion or probable cause is not required before using an ALPR.

(c) Partial license plates and unique vehicle descriptions reported during major crimes should be entered into the ALPR system in an attempt to identify suspect vehicles.

(d) No member of this department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing department-approved training.

(e) If practicable, the officer should verify an ALPR response through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) before taking enforcement action that is based solely on an ALPR alert. Once an alert is received, the operator should confirm
that the observed license plate from the system matches the license plate of the observed vehicle. Before any law enforcement action is taken because of an ALPR alert, the alert will be verified through a CLETS inquiry via MDC or through Dispatch. Members will not take any police action that restricts the freedom of any individual based solely on an ALPR alert unless it has been validated. Because the ALPR alert may relate to a vehicle and may not relate to the person operating the vehicle, officers are reminded that they need to have reasonable suspicion and/or probable cause to make an enforcement stop of any vehicle. (For example, if a vehicle is entered into the system because of its association with a wanted individual, Officers should attempt to visually match the driver to the description of the wanted subject prior to making the stop or should have another legal basis for making the stop.)

(f) Hot Lists. Designation of hot lists to be utilized by the ALPR system shall be made by the ALPR Administrator or his/her designee. Hot lists shall be obtained or compiled from sources as may be consistent with the purposes of the ALPR system set forth in this Policy. Hot lists utilized by the Department’s LPR system may be updated by agency sources more frequently than the Department may be uploading them and thus the Department’s LPR system will not have access to real time data. Occasionally, there may be errors in the LPR system’s read of a license plate. Therefore, an alert alone shall not be a basis for police action (other than following the vehicle of interest). Prior to initiation of a stop of a vehicle or other intervention based on an alert, Department members shall undertake the following:

(1) Verification of status on a Hot List. An officer must receive confirmation, from a Vallejo Police Department Communications Dispatcher or other department computer device, that the license plate is still stolen, wanted, or otherwise of interest before proceeding (absent exigent circumstances).

(2) Visual verification of license plate number. Officers shall visually verify that the license plate of interest matches identically with the image of the license plate number captured (read) by the LPR, including both the alphanumeric characters of the license plate, state of issue, and vehicle descriptors before proceeding. Department members alerted to the fact that an observed motor vehicle’s license plate is entered as a Hot Plate (hit) in a specific BOLO (be on the lookout) list are required to make a reasonable effort to confirm that a wanted person is actually in the vehicle and/or that a reasonable basis exists before a Department member would have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle.

(3) Department members will clear all stops from hot list alerts by indicating the positive ALPR Hit, i.e., with an arrest or other enforcement action. If it is not obvious in the text of the call as to the correlation of the ALPR Hit and the arrest, then the Department member shall update with the Communications Dispatcher and original person and/or a crime analyst inputting the vehicle in the hot list (hit).

(4) General Hot Lists (SVS, SFR, and SLR) will be automatically downloaded into the ALPR system a minimum of once a day with the most current data overwriting the old data.

(5) All entries and updates of specific Hot Lists within the ALPR system will be documented by the requesting Department member within the appropriate general offense report. As such, specific Hot Lists shall be approved by the ALPR
Administrator (or his/her designee) before initial entry within the ALPR system. The updating of such a list within the ALPR system shall thereafter be accomplished pursuant to the approval of the Department member’s immediate supervisor. The hits from these data sources should be viewed as informational; created solely to bring the officers attention to specific vehicles that have been associated with criminal activity.

All Hot Plates and suspect information entered into the ALPR system will contain the following information as a minimum:

- Entering Department member's name
- Related case number.
- Short synopsis describing the nature of the originating call

(g) Training. No member of this Department shall operate ALPR equipment or access ALPR data without first completing Department-approved training.

(h) Login/Log-Out Procedure. To ensure proper operation and facilitate oversight of the ALPR system, all users will be required to have individual credentials for access and use of the systems and/or data, which has the ability to be fully audited.

**Permitted/Impermissible Uses.** The ALPR system, and all data collected, is the property of the Vallejo Police Department. Department personnel may only access and use the ALPR system for official and legitimate law enforcement purposes consistent with this Policy. The following uses of the ALPR system are specifically prohibited:

1. **Invasion of Privacy:** Except when done pursuant to a court order such as a search warrant, is a violation of this Policy to utilize the ALPR to record license plates except those of vehicles that are exposed to public view (e.g., vehicles on a public road or street, or that are on private property but whose license plate(s) are visible from a public road, street, or a place to which members of the public have access, such as the parking lot of a shop or other business establishment).

2. **Harassment or Intimidation:** It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.

3. **Use Based on a Protected Characteristic.** It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists solely because of a person's, or group's race, gender, religion, political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, or other classification protected by law.

4. **Personal Use:** It is a violation of this Policy to use the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for any personal purpose.

5. **First Amendment Rights.** It is a violation of this policy to use the LPR system or associated scan files or hot lists for the purpose or known effect of infringing upon First Amendment rights.
Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the ALPR system or associated scan files or hot lists may be subject to:

- criminal prosecution,
- civil liability, and/or
- administrative sanctions, up to and including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and Department policies.

426.4 DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION
The Investigations Bureau Captain is responsible for ensuring systems and processes are in place for the proper collection and retention of ALPR data. Data will be transferred from vehicles to the designated storage in accordance with department procedures.

All ALPR data downloaded to the server should be stored for no longer than one year, and in accordance with the established records retention schedule. Thereafter, ALPR data should be purged unless it has become, or it is reasonable to believe it will become, evidence in a criminal or civil action or is subject to a discovery request or other lawful action to produce records. In those circumstances the applicable data should be downloaded from the server onto portable media and booked into evidence.

ALPR vendor, Flock Safety will store the data (data hosting) and ensure proper maintenance and security of data stored in their data towers. Flock Safety will purge their data at the end of the 30 days of storage. However, this will not preclude VPD from maintaining any relevant vehicle data obtained from the system after that period pursuant to the established City of Vallejo retention schedule mentioned above or outlined elsewhere.

Restrictions on use of ALPR Data: Information gathered or collected, and records retained by Flock Safety cameras or any other VPD ALPR system will not be sold, accessed, or used for any purpose other than legitimate law enforcement or public safety purposes.

426.5 ACCOUNTABILITY and SAFEGUARDS
All data will be closely safeguarded and protected by both procedural and technological means. The Vallejo Police Department will observe the following safeguards regarding access to and use of stored data (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53):

(a) All non-law enforcement requests for access to stored ALPR data shall be processed in accordance with applicable law.

(b) All ALPR data downloaded to the mobile workstation shall be accessible only through a login/password-protected system capable of documenting all access of information by name, date, and time.

(c) Persons approved to access ALPR data under these guidelines are permitted to access the data for legitimate law enforcement purposes only, such as when the data relate to a specific criminal investigation or department-related civil or administrative action.
(d) Such ALPR data may be released to other authorized and verified law enforcement officials and agencies for legitimate law enforcement purposes.

(e) Every ALPR Detection Browsing Inquiry must be documented by either the associated Vallejo Police case number or incident number, and/or a reason for the inquiry.

For security or data breaches, see the Records Release and Maintenance Policy.

426.6 POLICY

The policy of the Vallejo Police Department is to utilize ALPR technology to capture and store digital license plate data and images while recognizing the established privacy rights of the public.

All data and images gathered by the ALPR are for the official use of this department. Because such data may contain confidential information, it is not open to public review.

The Vallejo Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, pursuant to the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq) – these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CPB).

462.7 ALPR DATA DETECTION BROWSING AUDITS

It is the responsibility of the Professional Standards Division (PSD) Lieutenant or the Chief’s designee to ensure that an audit is conducted of ALPR detection browsing inquiries at least once during each calendar year. The Department will audit a sampling of the ALPR system utilization from the prior 12-month period to verify proper use in accordance with the above-authorized uses. The audit shall randomly select at least 10 detection browsing inquiries conducted by department employees during the preceding six-month period and determine if each inquiry meets the requirements established in policy section 462.5(e).

The audit shall be documented in the form of an internal department memorandum to the Chief of Police. The memorandum shall include any data errors found so that such errors can be corrected. After review by the Chief of Police, the memorandum and any associated documentation shall be filed and retained by PSD.

426.8 RELEASING ALPR DATA

The ALPR data may be shared only with other law enforcement or prosecutorial agencies for official law enforcement purposes or as otherwise permitted by law.

(a) The agency makes a written request for the ALPR data that includes:

(1) The name of the agency.
(2) The name of the person requesting.
(3) The intended purpose of obtaining the information.
(b) The request is reviewed by the Chief of Police or the authorized designee and approved before the request is fulfilled.

(c) The Chief of Police or the authorized designee will consider the California Values Act (Government Code § 7282.5; Government Code § 7284.2 et seq), before approving the release of ALPR data. The Vallejo Police Department does not permit the sharing of ALPR data gathered by the City or its contractors/subcontractors for purpose of federal immigration enforcement, these federal immigration agencies include Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CPB).

(d) The approved request is retained on file. Requests for ALPR data by non-law enforcement or non-prosecutorial agencies will be processed as provided in the Records Maintenance and Release Policy (Civil Code § 1798.90.55).

426.9 TRAINING
The Training Sergeant should ensure that members receive department-approved training for those authorized to use or access the ALPR system (Civil Code § 1798.90.51; Civil Code § 1798.90.53).